Among the Egyptian society are growing the doubts concerning the correctness of the Higher Council of the Armed Forces’ (HCAF) activity after the 25th of January revolution. The assessment of the events after Hosni Mubarak’s fall shows that both the stepping down of the former President and the unprecedented transfer of the country rule into the hands of the army has followed a pre-agreed scenario. It can be assumed that several goals have been pursued. The main one is to subdue the rage of the revolution and to blur the guilt by distracting the public attention away from the real culprits for the crisis in Egypt and through a loyal to the regime government HCAF. Simultaneously it is intended during the interim period of power transfer from the HCAF into the hands of the civil society to create favorable conditions for the exoneration of the compromised rulers and their return on the political scene with a new image.
The Egypt military traditionally enjoy high social trust and support. The facts that they do not participate in internal political scuffles, they have no repression functions against the population etc. contribute to this public attitude. All presidents of the country have risen from the circles of the senior officers during the last almost 60 years. At the same time during the years the supreme military staff appointed, promoted, decorated and demoted personally by the President used to form an oligarchic society loyal to the ruler. For these their merits and after retiring the senior officers used to be appointed for life and still holding the offices of governors, general managers, company managers continuing to serve the rulers. There are well founded suspicions that a part of the generals including the Minister of Defense Field Marshall Tantawi and other members of the HCAF are corrupt and enriched through embezzlement and profiteering. Consequently it is reasonable that the military continue to delay the beginning of the investigation against Mubarak, his family as well as others from the oligarchic military circles. The prevailing conclusion is that the role of the HCAF is not to assist the democratic processes but rather to delay them as long as possible. No doubt those different legal tools will be applied with the help of which obstacles for the organizational structuring and grow of the newly emerged /with a considerable democratic potential/ parties will be created. Probably it will be attempted under the shadow of the suspended Constitution although certain amendments were passed, to speed up the Parliamentary and Presidential elections and to deny the democratic forces the possibility to regroup.
There are other signs of the HCAF role hindering the democratic development, the analysis of the events shows. As high ranking sympathizers /army is depoliticized/ of the National Democratic Party /NDP/ the military will most probably back the initiated tacit campaign for the hoisting of the “Muslim Brotherhood” into power /NDP voted for the constitutional reforms/. This is a well calculated move aimed at scaring and manipulating the public and by which the path for the coming back of the NDP at a later stage will be cleared. The activity of the HCAF can be assessed as aimed at accomplishing precisely the above scenario. By approving the law criminalizing strikes and protests the public is being deprived of its fundamental right to defend its rights. The law offenders may be subject to a fine of up to half a million pounds /ca. USD 100 000/. The law was enforced on 23 March dispersing striking students from the Faculty of Mass Communications at Cairo University. The students’ demands for suspending the Faculty dean and the university lecturers associated with the MB and conducting political activity on the university campus, were drowned by the military police. Notwithstanding the legal bans of entry into university halls of residence this was done. Professors, lecturers and students against whom physical force was applied were detained. Nowadays the crimes and personal assaults including rape are becoming more frequent in Egypt and especially in the capital Cairo. It is logical to consider that it is more pressing that the HCAF had focused its attention on combating crime instead of approving the law against the strikes and protests.
The analysis of the HCAF activity indicates that the Council demonstrates partiality towards the remnants of the former regime and that it will try to hinder the democratic transformations. It is possible that its support for the clandestine resistance of the deposed regime increases in the future. This support will materialize in passing legal acts and in misuse of the danger of the striving for power “Muslim Brotherhood” but secretly backing it. Apparently it is essential to sooner execute the transfer of power from the HCAF.
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